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Abstract
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet,
without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success
tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This
contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical
approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from
bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral
strategies: non-cooperative individuals (“defectors”), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment ef-
forts (called “cooperators” or “second-order free-riders”), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior
(“moralists”), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves (“immoral-
ists”). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting
effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segre-
gation of behavioral strategies and solves the “second-order free-rider problem”. Second, the system behavior
changes its character significantly even after very long times (“who laughs last laughs best effect”). Third, the
presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing coopera-
tors. Forth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an “unholy
collaboration”. Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows to understand the
establishment and spreading of “moral behavior” by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates
that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with
non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors becomes understandable
as result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
Author Summary
Why do friends spontaneously come up with mutually accepted rules, cooperation, and solidarity, while the
creation of shared moral standards often fails in large communities? In a “global village”, where everybody may
interact with anybody else, it is not worthwhile to punish people who cheat. Moralists (cooperative individuals
who undertake punishment efforts) disappear because of their disadvantage compared to cooperators who
do not punish (so-called “second-order free-riders”). However, cooperators are exploited by free-riders. This
creates a “tragedy of the commons”, where everybody is uncooperative in the end. Yet, when people interact
with friends or local neighbors, as most people do, moralists can escape the direct competition with non-
punishing cooperators by separating from them. Moreover, in the competition with free-riders, moralists
can defend their interests better than non-punishing cooperators. Therefore, while seriously depleted in the
beginning, moralists can finally spread all over the world (“who laughs last laughs best effect”). Strikingly, the
presence of a few non-cooperative individuals (“deviant behavior”) can accelerate the victory of moralists. In
order to spread, moralists may also form an “unholy cooperation” with people having double moral standards,
i.e. free-riders who punish non-cooperative behavior, while being uncooperative themselves.
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Introduction
Public goods such as environmental resources or social benefits are particularly prone to exploitation by non-
cooperative individuals (“defectors”), who try to increase their benefit at the expense of fair contributors or
users, the “cooperators”. This implies a tragedy of commons [1]. It was proposed that costly punishment
of non-cooperative individuals can establish cooperation in public goods dilemmas [2–8], and it is effective
indeed [9–11]. Nonetheless, why would cooperators choose to punish defectors at a personal cost [12–14]? One
would expect that evolutionary pressure should eventually eliminate such “moralists” due to their extra costs
compared to “second-order free-riders” (i.e. cooperators, who do not punish). These, however should finally
be defeated by “free-riders” (defectors). To overcome this problem [15,16], it was proposed that cooperators
who punish defectors (called “moralists” by us) would survive through indirect reciprocity [17], reputation
effects [18] or the possibility to abstain from the joint enterprize [19–21] by “volunteering” [22, 23]. Without
such mechanisms, cooperators who punish will usually vanish. Surprisingly, however, the second-order free-
rider problem is naturally resolved, without assuming additional mechanisms, if spatial or network interactions
are considered. This will be shown in the following.
In order to study the conditions for the disappearance of non-punishing cooperators and defectors, we
simulate the public goods game with costly punishment, considering two cooperative strategies (C, M) and
two defective ones (D, I). For illustration, one may imagine that cooperators (C) correspond to countries
trying to meet the CO2 emission standards of the Kyoto protocol [24], and “moralists” (M) to cooperative
countries that additionally enforce the standards by international pressure (e.g. embargoes). Defectors (D)
would correspond to those countries ignoring the Kyoto protocol, and immoralists (I) to countries failing to
meet the Kyoto standards, but nevertheless imposing pressure on other countries to fulfil them. According
to the classical game-theoretical prediction, all countries would finally fail to meet the emission standards,
but we will show that, in a spatial setting, interactions between the four strategies C, D, M, and I can
promote the spreading of moralists. Other well-known public goods problems are over-fishing, the pollution
of our environment, the creation of social benefit systems, or the establishment and maintenance of cultural
institutions (such as a shared language, norms, values, etc.).
Our simplified game-theoretical description of such problems assumes that cooperators (C) and moralists
(M) make a contribution of 1 to the respective public good under consideration, while nothing is contributed
by defectors (D) and “immoralists” (I), i.e. defectors who punish other defectors. The sum of all contributions
is multiplied by a factor r reflecting synergy effects of cooperation, and the resulting amount is equally shared
among the k + 1 interacting individuals. Moreover, moralists and immoralists impose a fine β/k on each
defecting individual (playing D or I), which produces an additional cost γ/k per punished defector to them
(see Methods for details). The division by k scales for the group size, but for simplicity, the parameter β is
called the punishment fine and γ the punishment cost.
Given the same interaction partners, an immoralist never gets a higher payoff than a defector, but does
equally well in a cooperative environment. Moreover, a cooperator tends to outperform a moralist, given the
interaction partners are the same. However, a cooperator can do better than a defector when the punishment
fine β is large enough.
It is known that punishment in the public goods game and similar games can promote cooperation above a
certain critical threshold of the synergy factor r [11,25]. Besides cooperators who punish defectors, Heckathorn
considered “full cooperators” (moralists) and “hypocritical cooperators” (immoralists) [26]. For well-mixed
interactions (where individuals interact with a representative rather than local strategy distribution), Eldakar
and Wilson find that altruistic punishment (moralists) can spread, if second-order free-riders (non-punishing al-
truists) are excluded, and that selfish punishers (immoralists) can survive together with altruistic non-punishers
(cooperators), provided that selfish nonpunishers (defectors) are sufficiently scarce [27].
Besides well-mixed interactions, some researchers have also investigated the effect of spatial interactions
[5,11,28,29], since it is known that they can support the survival or spreading of cooperators [30] (but this is
not always the case [31,32]). In this way, Brandt et al. discovered a coexistence of cooperators and defectors
for certain parameter combinations [11]. Compared to these studies, our model assumes somewhat different
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replication and strategy updating rules. The main point, however, is that we have chosen long simulation
times and scanned the parameter space more extensively, which revealed several new insights, for example,
the possible coexistence of immoralists and moralists, even when a substantial number of defectors is present
initially. When interpreting our results within the context of moral dynamics [33], our main discoveries for a
society facing public goods games may be summarized as follows:
1. Victory over second-order free-riders: Over a long enough time period, moralists fully eliminate coopera-
tors, thereby solving the “second-order free-rider problem”. This becomes possible by spatial segregation
of the two cooperative strategies C and M, where the presence of defectors puts moralists in a advan-
tageous position, which eventually allows moralists to get rid of non-punishing cooperators.
2. “Who laughs last laughs best effect”: Moralists defeat cooperators even when the defective strategies I
and D are eventually eliminated, but this process is very slow. That is, the system behavior changes its
character significantly even after very long times. This is the essence of the “who laughs last laughs best
effect”. The finally winning strategy can be in a miserable situation in the beginning, and its victory
may take very long.
3. “Lucifer’s positive side effect”: By permanently generating a number of defectors, small mutation rates
can considerably accelerate the spreading of moralists.
4. “Unholy collaboration” of moralists with immoralists: Under certain conditions, moralists can survive by
profiting from immoralists. This actually provides the first explanation for the existence of defectors, who
hypocritically punish other defectors, although they defect themselves. The occurrence of this strange
behavior is well-known in reality and even experimentally confirmed [34, 35].
These discoveries required a combination of theoretical considerations and extensive computer simulations on
multiple processors over long time horizons.
Results
For well-mixed interactions, defectors are the winners of the evolutionary competition among the four behavioral
strategies C, D, M, and I [36], which implies a tragedy of the commons despite punishment efforts. The reason
is that cooperators (second-order free-riders) spread at the cost of moralists, while requiring them for their
own survival.
Conclusions from computer simulations are strikingly different, if the assumption of well-mixed interactions
is replaced by the more realistic assumption of spatial interactions. When cooperators and defectors interact in
space [5,11,37–44], it is known that some cooperators can survive through spatial clustering [45]. However, it
is not clear how the spatiotemporal dynamics and the frequency of cooperation would change in the presence
of moralists and immoralists. Would spatial interactions be able to promote the spreading of punishment and
thereby eliminate second-order free-riders?
In order to explore this, we have scanned a large parameter space. Figure 1 shows the resulting state of the
system as a function of the punishment cost γ and punishment fine β after a sufficiently long transient time.
If the fine-to-cost ratio β/γ and the synergy factor r are low, defectors eliminate all other strategies. However,
for large enough fines β, cooperators and defectors are always eliminated, and moralists prevail (Fig. 1).
At larger r values, when the punishment costs are moderate, we find a coexistence of moralists with de-
fectors without any cooperators. To understand why moralists can outperform cooperators despite additional
punishment costs, it is important to analyze the dynamics of spatial interactions. Starting with a homogeneous
strategy distribution (Fig. 2a), the imitation of better-performing neighbors generates small clusters of indi-
viduals with identical strategies (Fig. 2b). “Immoralists” die out quickly, while cooperators and moralists form
separate clusters in a sea of defectors (Fig. 2c). The further development is determined by the interactions
at the interfaces between clusters of different strategies (Figs. 2d–f). In the presence of defectors, the fate of
Evolutionary establishment of moral... 4
moralists is not decided by a direct competition with cooperators, but rather by the success of both cooperative
strategies against invasion attempts by defectors. If the β/γ-ratio is appropriate, moralists respond better to
defectors than cooperators. Indeed, moralists can spread so successfully in the presence of defectors that areas
lost by cooperators are quickly occupied by moralists (supplementary Video S1). This indirect territorial battle
ultimately leads to the extinction of cooperators (Fig. 2f), thus resolving the second-order free-rider problem.
In conclusion, the presence of some conventional free-riders (defectors) supports the elimination of second-
order free-riders. However, if the fine-to-cost ratio is high, defectors are eliminated after some time. Then, the
final struggle between moralists and cooperators takes such a long time that cooperators and moralists seem
to coexist in a stable way. Nevertheless, a very slow coarsening of clusters is revealed, when simulating over
extremely many iterations. This process is finally won by moralists, as they are in the majority by the time the
defectors disappear, while they happen to be in the minority during the first stage of the simulation (see Fig.
2). We call this the “who laughs last laughs best effect”. Since the payoffs of cooperators and moralists are
identical in the absence of other strategies, the underlying coarsening dynamics is expected to agree with the
voter model [46].
Note that there is always a punishment fine β, for which moralists can outcompete all other strategies.
The higher the synergy factor r, the lower the β/γ-ratio required to reach the prevalence of moralists. Yet,
for larger values of r, the system behavior also becomes richer, and there are areas for small fines or high
punishment costs, where clusters with different strategies can coexist (see Figs. 1b–d). For example, we
observe the coexistence of clusters of moralists and defectors (see Fig. 2 and supplementary Video S1) or of
cooperators and defectors (see supplementary Video S2).
Finally, for low punishment costs γ but moderate punishment fines and synergy factors r (see Fig. 1d), the
survival of moralists may require the coexistence with “immoralists” (see Fig. 3 and supplementary Video S3).
Such immoralists are often called “sanctimonious” or blamed for “double moral standards”, as they defect
themselves, while enforcing the cooperation of others (for the purpose of exploitation). This is actually the
main obstacle for the spreading of immoralists, as they have to pay punishment costs, while suffering from
punishment fines as well. Therefore, immoralists need small punishment costs γ to survive. As cooperators
die out quickly for moderate values of r, the survival of immoralists depends on the existence of moralists
they can exploit, otherwise they cannot outperform defectors. Conversely, moralists benefit from immoralists
by supporting the punishment of defectors. Note, however, that this mutually profitable interaction between
moralists and immoralists, which appears like an “unholy collaboration”, is fragile: If β is increased, immoralists
suffer from fines, and if γ is increased, punishing becomes too costly. In both cases, immoralists die out, and
the coexistence of moralists and immoralists breaks down. Despite this fragility, “hypocritical” defectors, who
punish other defectors, are known to occur in reality. Their existence has even been found in experiments
[34, 35]. Here, we have revealed conditions for their occurrence.
Discussion
In summary, the second-order free-rider problem finds a natural and simple explanation, without requiring
additional assumptions, if the local nature of most social interactions is taken into account and punishment
efforts are large enough. In fact, the presence of spatial interactions can change the system behavior so dra-
matically that we do not find the dominance of free-riders (defectors) as in the case of well-mixed interactions,
but a prevalence of moralists via a “who laughs last laughs best” effect (Fig. 2). Moralists can escape dis-
advantageous kinds of competition with cooperators by spatial segregation. However, their triumph over all
the other strategies requires the temporary presence of defectors, who diminish the cooperators (second-order
free-riders). Finally, moralists can take over, as they have reached a superiority over cooperators (which is
further growing) and as they can outcompete defectors (conventional free-riders).
Our findings stress how crucial spatial or network interactions in social systems are. Their consideration
gives rise to a rich variety of possible dynamics and a number of continuous or discontinuous transitions between
qualitatively different system behaviors. Spatial interactions can even invert the finally expected system
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behavior and, thereby, explain a number of challenging puzzles of social, economic, and biological systems. This
includes the higher-than-expected level of cooperation in social dilemma situations, the elimination of second-
order free-riders, and the formation of what looks like a collaboration between otherwise inferior strategies.
By carefully scanning the parameter space, we found several possible kinds of coexistence between two
strategies each:
• Moralists (M) and defectors (D) can coexist, when the disadvantage of cooperative behavior is not
too large (i.e. the synergy factor is high enough), and if the punishment fine is sufficiently large that
moralists can survive among defectors, but not large enough to get rid of them.
• Instead of M and D, moralists (M) and immoralists (I) coexist, when the punishment cost is small
enough. The small punishment cost is needed to ensure that the disadvantage of punishing defectors (I)
compared to non-punishing defectors (D) is small enough that it can be compensated by the additional
punishment efforts contributed by moralists.
• To explain the well-known coexistence of D and C [11], it is useful to remember that defectors can be
crowded out by cooperators, when the synergy factor exceeds a critical value (even when punishment
is not considered). Slightly below this threshold, neither cooperators nor defectors have a sufficient
advantage to get rid of the other strategy, which results in a coexistence of both strategies.
Generally, a coexistence of strategies occurs, when the payoffs at the interface between clusters of different
strategies are balanced. In order to understand why the coexistence is possible in a certain parameter area
rather than just for an infinitely small parameter set, it is important to consider that typical cluster sizes
vary with the parameter values. This also changes the typical radius of the interface between the coexisting
strategies and, thereby, the typical number of neighbors applying the same strategy or a different one. In other
words, a change in the shape of a cluster can partly counter-balance payoff differences between two strategies
by varying the number of “friends” and “enemies” involved in the battle at the interface between spatial areas
with different strategies (see Fig. 4).
Finally, we would like to discuss the robustness of our observations. It is well-known that the level of
cooperation in the public goods game is highest in small groups [10]. However, we have found that moralists
can crowd out non-punishing cooperators also for group sizes of k+1 = 9, 13, 21, or 25 interacting individuals,
for example. In the limiting case of large groups, where everybody interacts with everybody else, we expect
the outcome of the well-mixed case, which corresponds to defection by everybody (if other mechanisms like
reputation effects [11] or abstaining are not considered [20]). That is, the same mechanisms that can create
cooperation among friends may fail to establish shared moral standards, when spatial interactions are negligible.
It would therefore be interesting to study, whether the fact that interactions in the financial system are global,
has contributed to the financial crisis. Typically, when social communities exceed a certain size, they need
sanctioning institutions to stabilize cooperation (such as laws, an executive system, and police).
Note that our principal discoveries are not expected to change substantially for spatial interactions within
irregular grids (i.e. neighborhoods different from Moore neighborhoods) [47]. In case of network interactions,
we have checked that small-world or random networks lead to similar results, when the degree distribution is
the same (see Fig. 5). A heterogeneous degree distribution is even expected to reduce free-riding [37] (given
the average degree is the same). Finally, adding other cooperation-promoting mechanisms to our model such
as direct reciprocity (a shadow of the future through repeated interactions [49]), indirect reciprocity [17] (trust
and reputation effects [11, 18]), abstaining from a joint enterprize [19–23], or success-driven migration [50],
will strengthen the victory of moralists over conventional and second-order free-riders.
In order to test the robustness of our observations, we have also checked the effect of randomness (“noise”)
originating from the possibility of strategy mutations. It is known that mutations may promote cooperation
[51]. According to the numerical analysis of the spatial public goods game with punishment, the introduction
of rare mutations does not significantly change the final outcome of the competition between moralists and
non-punishing cooperators. Second-order free-riders will always be a negligible minority in the end, if the
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fine-to-cost ratio and mutation rate allows moralists to spread. While a large mutation rate naturally causes
a uniform distribution of strategies, a low level of strategy mutations can be even beneficial for moralists.
Namely, by permanently generating a number of defectors, small mutation rates can considerably accelerate
the spreading of moralists, i.e. the slow logarithmic coarsening is replaced by another kind of dynamics [52].
Defectors created by mutations play the same role as in the D+M phase (see Figs. 1+2). They put moralists
into an advantage over non-punishing cooperators, resulting in a faster spreading of the moralists (which
facilitates the elimination of second-order free-riders over realistic time periods). In this way, the presence of
a few “bad guys” (defectors) can accelerate the spreading of moral standards. Metaphorically speaking, we
call this “lucifer’s positive side effect”.
The current study paves the road for several interesting extensions. It is possible, for example, to study
antisocial punishment [53], considering also strategies which punish cooperators [54]. The conditions for the
survival or spreading of antisocial punishers can be identified by the same methodology, but the larger number
of strategies creates new phases in the parameter space. While the added complexity transcends what can
be discussed here, the current study demonstrates clearly how differentiated the moral dynamics in a society
facing public goods problems can be and how it depends on a variety of factors (such as the punishment cost,
punishment fine, and synergy factor). Going one step further, evolutionary game theory may even prove useful
to understand how moral feelings have evolved.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate the emergence of punishment within the framework of
a coevolutionary model [55–57], where both, individual strategies and punishment levels are simultaneously
spread. Such a model could, for example, assume that individuals show some exploration behavior [51] and stick
to successful punishment levels for a long time, while they quickly abandon unsuccessful ones. In the beginning
of this coevolutionary process, costly punishment would not pay off. However, after a sufficiently long time,
mutually fitting punishment strategies are expected to appear in the same neighborhood by coincidence [50].
Once an over-critical number of successful punishment strategies have appeared in some area of the simulated
space, they are eventually expected to spread. The consideration of success-driven migration should strongly
support this process [50]. Over many generations, genetic-cultural coevolution could finally inherit costly
punishment as a behavioral trait, as is suggested by the mechanisms of strong reciprocity [58].
Methods
We study the public goods game with punishment. Cooperative individuals (C and M) make a contribution of
1 to the public good, while defecting individuals (D and I) contribute nothing. The sum of all contributions
is multiplied by r and the resulting amount equally split among the k + 1 interacting individuals. A defecting
individual (D or I) suffers a fine β/k by each punisher among the interaction partners, and each punishment
requires a punisher (M or I) to spend a cost γ/k on each defecting individual among the interaction partners.
In other words, only defectors and punishing defectors (immoralists) are punished, and the overall punishment
is proportional to the sum of moralists and immoralists among the k neighbors. The scaling by k serves to
make our results comparable with models studying different groups sizes.
Denoting the number of so defined cooperators, defectors, moralists, and immoralists among the k
interaction partners by NC , ND, NM and NI , respectively, an individual obtains the following payoff:
If it is a cooperator, it gets PC = r(NC + NM + 1)/(k + 1) − 1, if a defector, the payoff is PD =
r(NC +NM )/(k + 1)− β(NM +NI)/k, a moralist receives PM = PC − γ(ND +NI)/k, and an immoralist
obtains PI = PD − γ(ND + NI)/k. Our model of the spatial variant of this game studies interactions in a
simple social network allowing for clustering. It assumes that individuals are distributed on a square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions and play a public goods game with k = 4 neighbors. We work with a fully
occupied lattice of size L × L with L = 200...1200 in Fig. 1 and L = 100 in Figs. 2–4 (the lattice size must
be large enough to avoid an accidental extinction of a strategy). The initial strategies of the L2 individuals
are equally and uniformly distributed. Then, we perform a random sequential update. The individual at the
randomly chosen location x belongs to five groups. (It is the focal individual of a Moore neighborhood and a
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member of the Moore neighborhoods of four nearest neighbors). It plays the public goods game with the k
interaction partners of a group g, and obtains a payoff P gx in all 5 groups it belongs to. The overall payoff is
Px =
∑
g P
g
x . Next, one of the four nearest neighbors is randomly chosen. Its location shall be denoted by y
and its overall payoff by Py. This neighbor imitates the strategy of the individual at location x with probability
q = 1/{1+ exp[(Py −Px)/K]} [45]. That is, individuals tend to imitate better performing strategies in their
neighborhood, but sometimes deviate (due to trial-and-error behavior or mistakes) [31]. Realistic noise levels
lie between the two extremes K → 0 (corresponding to unconditional imitation by the neighbor, whenever
the overall payoff Px is higher than Py) and K → ∞ (where the strategy is copied with probability 1/2,
independently of the payoffs). For the noise level K = 0.5 chosen in our study, the evolutionary selection
pressure is high enough to eventually eliminate poorly performing strategies in favor of strategies with a higher
overall payoff. This implies that the resulting frequency distribution of strategies in a large enough lattice is
independent of the specific initial condition after a sufficiently long transient time. Close to the separating
line between M and D+M in Fig. 1, the equilibration may require up to 107 iterations (involving L2 updates
each).
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Figure 1. Phase diagrams showing the remaining strategies in the spatial public goods
game with cooperators (C), defectors (D), moralists (M) and immoralists (I), after a
sufficiently long transient time. Initially, each of the four strategies occupies 25% of the sites of the
square lattice, and their distribution is uniform in space. However, due to their evolutionary
competition, two or three strategies die out after some time. The finally resulting state depends on the
synergy r of cooperation, the punishment cost γ, and the punishment fine β. The displayed phase
diagrams are for (a) r = 2.0, (b) r = 3.5, and (d) r = 4.4. (d) Enlargement of the small-cost area for
r = 3.5. Solid separating lines indicate that the resulting fractions of all strategies change continuously
with a modification of the model parameters β and γ, while broken lines correspond to discontinuous
changes. All diagrams show that cooperators cannot stop the spreading of moralists, if only the
fine-to-cost ratio is large enough. Furthermore, there are parameter regions where moralist can crowd
out cooperators in the presence of defectors. Note that the spreading of moralists is extremely slow and
follows a voter model kind of dynamics [46], if their competition with cooperators occurs in the absence
of defectors. Therefore, computer simulations had to be run over extremely long times (up to 107
iterations for a systems size of 400× 400). For similar reasons, a small level of strategy mutations
(which permanently creates a small number of strategies of all kinds, in particular defectors) can largely
accelerate the spreading of moralists in the M phase, while it does not significantly change the resulting
fractions of the four strategies [52]. The existence of immoralists is usually not relevant for the outcome
of the evolutionary dynamics. Apart from a very small parameter area, where immoralists and
moralists coexist, immoralists are quickly extinct. Therefore, the 4-strategy model usually behaves like
a model with the three strategies C, D, and M only. As a consequence, the phase diagrams for the
latter look almost the same like the ones presented here [59].
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Figure 2. Elimination of second-order free-riders (non-punishing cooperators) in the
spatial public goods game with costly punishment for r = 4.4, β = 0.1, and γ = 0.1. (a)
Initially, at time t = 0, cooperators (blue), defectors (red), moralists (green) and immoralists (yellow)
are uniformly distributed over the spatial lattice. (b) After a short time period (here, at t = 10),
defectors prevail. (c) After 100 iterations, immoralists have almost disappeared, and cooperators
prevail, since cooperators earn high payoffs when organized in clusters. (d) At t = 500, there is a
segregation of moralists and cooperators, with defectors in between. (e) The evolutionary battle
continues between cooperators and defectors on the one hand, and defectors and moralists on the other
hand (here at t = 1000). (f) At t = 2000, cooperators have been eliminated by defectors, and a small
fraction of defectors survives among a large majority of moralists. Interestingly, each strategy (apart
from I) has a time period during which it prevails, but only moralists can maintain their majority.
While moralists perform poorly in the beginning, they are doing well in the end. We refer to this as the
“who laughs last laughs best” effect.
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Figure 3. Coexistence of moralists and immoralists for r = 3.5, β = 0.12, and γ = 0.005,
supporting the occurrence of individuals with ‘double moral standards’ (who punish
defectors, while defecting themselves). (a) Initially, at time t = 0, cooperators (blue), defectors
(red), moralists (green) and immoralists (yellow) are uniformly distributed over the spatial lattice. (b)
After 250 iterations, cooperators have been eliminated in the competition with defectors (as the synergy
effect r of cooperation is not large enough), and defectors are prevailing. (c–e) The snapshots at
t = 760, t = 2250, and t = 6000 show the interdependence of moralists and immoralists, which appears
like a tacit collaboration. It is visible that the two punishing strategies win the struggle with defectors
by staying together. On the one hand, due to the additional punishment cost, immoralists can survive
the competition with defectors only by exploiting moralists. On the other hand, immoralists support
moralists in fighting defectors. (f) After 12000 iterations, defectors have disappeared completely,
leading to a coexistence of clusters of moralists with immoralists.
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Figure 4. Dependence of cluster shapes on the punishment fine β in the stationary state,
supporting an adaptive balance between the payoffs of two different strategies at the
interface between competing clusters. Snapshots in the top row were obtained for low punishment
fines, while the bottom row depicts results obtained for higher values of β. (a) Coexistence of moralists
and defectors for a synergy factor r = 3.5, punishment cost γ = 0.20, and punishment fine β = 0.25. (b)
Same parameters, apart from β = 0.4. (c) Coexistence of moralists and immoralists for r = 3.5,
γ = 0.05, and β = 0.12. (d) Same parameters, apart from β = 0.25. A similar change in the cluster
shapes is found for the coexistence of cooperators and defectors, if the synergy factor r is varied.
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Figure 5. Resulting fractions of the four strategies C, D, I, and M, for random regular
graphs as a function of the punishment fine β. The graphs were constructed by rewiring links of
a square lattice of size 400× 400 with probability Q, thereby preserving the degree distribution (i.e.
every player has 4 nearest neighbors) [48]. For small values of Q, small-world properties result, while for
Q→ 1, we have a random regular graph. By keeping the degree distribution fixed, we can study the
impact of randomness in the network structure independently of other effects. An inhomogeneous
degree distribution can further promote cooperation [37]. The results displayed here are averages over
10 simulation runs for the model parameters r = 3.5, γ = 0.05, and Q = 0.99. Similar results can be
obtained also for other parameter combinations.
